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GEORGE FLOYD’S LEGACY: REFORMING, RELATING, AND
RETHINKING THROUGH CHAUVIN’S CONVICTION AND APPEAL
UNDER A FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE LONG-WEAPONIZED
AGAINST PEOPLE OF COLOR
Greg Egan †
I. INEQUITY AND EVOLUTION: HOW POLICE USE OF FORCE
AND THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE ARE POISED TO
CHANGE ON THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF GEORGE
FLOYD’S DEATH
Minnesota’s second-degree felony-murder statute represents a unique
and creative charging mechanism that affords wide discretion to
prosecutors. This makes it ripe for inequitable application. It is the most
serious charge brought against George Floyd’s killer, Derek Chauvin. 1
Prosecutors can find novel ways to charge felony-murder for almost any
unintended death, and they often use it in cases where they also allege
homicidal intent. At the same time, it is a charge prosecutors can find
plausible justification not to bring in most cases. This wide discretion
provides leverage to prosecutors in plea negotiations. Plea negotiations can
work to the benefit of defendants who are initially charged with seconddegree intentional murder by affording them the opportunity to plead down
to felony-murder, which carries less than half the guideline sentence. 2 This
wide charging discretion also has the potential to unfairly elevate crimes that
should have been charged as manslaughter, third-degree murder, or other
lesser offenses. The discretion can entail a twenty-fold inflation in
sentencing over the charges on which it is commonly predicated. 3 For these

†. The Author is a veteran felony trial attorney in the office of the Ramsey County
Public Defender and an adjunct professor at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He thanks
Anne Bolgert, Abbie Maier, and Andrew Selva not only for their tireless work as research
assistants, but also for their thoughtful analytical insight. The author also thanks Sam Brower.
1. Complaint at 1, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2020).
2. Sentencing guidelines provide for 306 months for intentional second-degree murder
and 150 months for second-degree felony-murder for an offender with no criminal history.
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION 2020). There are recent Minnesota cases where even defendants indicted for
first-degree premeditated murder were allowed to plead all the way down to second-degree
felony-murder. See infra Section II.B.
3. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a) (2020) (providing for a two-year statutory
maximum penalty for reckless or unlawful intentional discharge of a firearm), with MINN.
STAT. § 609.19(2) (2020) (providing for a forty-year statutory maximum for second-degree
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reasons, the charging and disposition of felony-murder cases reveal much
about racial disparities in the larger criminal justice system.
The felony-murder doctrine is frequently weaponized against people
of color, while prosecutors and judges allow White defendants to exploit
the doctrine to their benefit. Killings by peace officers magnify the disparity;
officers who should be charged with felony-murder instead face reduced
charges, or more frequently, no charges at all. 4 The victim’s and the killer’s
race matter, both in police killings and in the broader application of the
felony-murder doctrine. This context allows for an informed assessment of
the evolution Minnesota and the world have undergone in the year since
George Floyd’s killing. It also provides a framework for an analysis of the
inevitable appeal of Chauvin’s convictions and the implications this may
have on reform or abolition of the felony-murder doctrine. It situates this
prosecution within the affected community as it moves forward through
reform, growth, and unity.
Section II of this Article analyzes sentencings, plea negotiations,
convictions, and charging under Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine across
race, buttressing statistics with examples and exposing racial inequities in the
way the felony-murder doctrine is deployed. Section III provides a legal
analysis of the case against Philando Castile’s killer, Jeronimo Yanez. While
the world applauded the second-degree manslaughter charge against Yanez,
the case was actually ripe for felony-murder charging. This section
juxtaposes the Yanez case with a more obscure shooting by a defendant of
color who was not a peace officer, illustrating that a killing by a peace officer
can be more egregious, yet not result in charges of the level faced by a lay
person of color. Section IV exposes how Minnesota peace officers who kill
have, until now, rarely been prosecuted at any level. It provides a brief
overview of the only other four prosecuted Minnesota police killings in
recent memory, reconciling these cases with larger trends and accounting
for race. The section weighs the implications of Chauvin’s appeal of his
convictions against the broader historical abuses of the felony-murder
doctrine. It analyzes the impact these legal proceedings have on public

felony-murder). Relative to statutory maximum comparisons, the disparities are generally less
pronounced when it comes to guideline sentences for common predicate felonies. But they
are still marked. An offender with a criminal history score of zero faces a guideline sentence
of twenty-one months for second-degree assault and 150 months for second-degree felonymurder. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2020). A guideline sentence for an offender with no criminal
history who is convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm is probation. Id.
4. See infra Section IV.
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policy and recognizes their symbolic and social power, which reframes the
hurt, the hope, and the heart of the Twin Cities community. 5
II.

THE COLOR OF INJUSTICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
CHARGING AND DISPOSITION OF SECOND-DEGREE
FELONY-MURDER CASES

Defendants of color have different outcomes under the felony-murder
doctrine than White defendants. When defendants of color are charged
with more serious murder counts, they are less likely to be afforded the
opportunity to plead down to second-degree felony-murder. 6 Defendants of
color are more often convicted of the most serious charge when the top
count is second-degree felony-murder. 7 They are statistically more likely to
be convicted in general and are often sentenced more harshly upon
conviction. 8 Individual cases across demographics fortify these statistical
trends, making it clear that the felony-murder doctrine has long been
weaponized against people of color, while representing a relatively lenient
alternative for White defendants.
The statistics relied upon in this Article were drawn from a set of all
second-degree felony-murder convictions sentenced from 2012 through
2018 in Ramsey and Hennepin counties, where St. Paul and Minneapolis
are respectively located. 9 The data set includes offenders who initially faced
lesser or greater charges, so long as the conviction was ultimately for seconddegree felony-murder. The statistical set includes cases that were resolved
through guilty pleas as well as trial convictions. The data include the length
of sentences, alongside the guideline sentences. Offender age, gender, and
race are also included. This data set reveals much about the deployment,
effect, and backdrop of Minnesota’s felony-murder rule in perpetuating
racial inequities.

A. Racially Disparate Sentencings
Sentencing statistics across race expose disparities in the application of
the felony-murder doctrine. White defendants sentenced to second-degree

5. The Twin Cities is a colloquialism referring to the greater Minneapolis and Saint
Paul metropolitan region, generally. For the purposes of this Article, Twin Cities refers to
Ramsey and Hennepin counties where the data was gathered from.
6. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER,
§ 609.19, SUBD. 2(1): SENTENCED 2012–2018 (2020) (on file with author).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
ND
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felony-murder in Ramsey and Hennepin counties from 2012 to 2018 were
two-and-a-half times more likely to receive a shorter-than-guideline sentence
relative to a longer-than-guideline sentence. 10 Meanwhile, defendants of
color received mitigated and aggravated sentencing departures at roughly
the same rate. 11 Judges gave reduced sentences to White defendants 25
percent of the time, compared to 16 percent for defendants of color. 12 One
White defendant was sentenced to a mere five years for his involvement in
a drug deal where the victim was shot to death. 13 While the defendant did
not fire the fatal shots, he was also armed. 14
This disparity is also manifested by cases involving White defendants
committing egregious crimes but receiving guideline sentences, instead of
the aggravated sentences that similarly-situated defendants of color
frequently receive. Even after hearing all the gruesome evidence during a
jury trial of a White defendant who tortured his girlfriend to death, a
sentencing judge ordered a guideline range sentence. 15 The defendant had
beaten the victim over her entire body. 16 There were scrapes and scratches
on her arms and knees, likely from her attempt to crawl away. 17 The
defendant fractured her neck before ultimately choking her to death. 18 He
admitted to choking her the night before as well. 19 If ever a case warranted
an aggravated sentencing departure, this one did. However, the White
defendant was given a guideline-range sentence. 20
Even when an aggravated sentence is arguably warranted for a
defendant of color, 21 it can still be disproportionately harsh and glaringly out
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–4, State v. Sjostrand, No. 62-CR-18-219 (Ramsey
Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012).
14. Id. at 2–3.
15. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2, State v. Manney, No. 27-CR-11-16860 (Ramsey
Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Like the trial judge, who exercised relative leniency at sentencing, prosecutors were
lenient to this White defendant by declining to seek an indictment under the domestic abuse
provision of the first-degree murder statute. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(6) (2010) (providing
for culpability when an actor “causes the death of a human being while committing domestic
abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse . . . and the
death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life”).
20. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
21. See e.g., Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–3, State v. Meak, No. 62-CR-15-1070
ND
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of sync with what similarly-situated White defendants receive. An Asian
defendant received a sentence double the presumptive sentence for killing
a child in his care. 22 Sentencing guideline ranges suggest that he had a
criminal history score of zero. 23 Meanwhile, a White woman who suffocated
her infant to death before almost killing a second child the same way
received a sentence of barely half of what the sentencing guidelines
prescribed. 24 There should be parity in sentencing across race under the
felony-murder statute, but there is not.

B. Plea Negotiations and Convictions Across Race
On their surface, the racial demographics of second-degree felonymurder convictions in the Twin Cities support the claim of widespread
racial disparity. Minnesota’s population is approximately 83.8 percent
White. 25 A higher concentration of people of color reside in the St.
Paul/Minneapolis metro area, 26 which is 77.1 percent White. 27 Seconddegree felony-murder conviction statistics do not mirror this demographic
data. Between 2012 and 2018, defendants of color accounted for 80.2
percent of felony-murder convictions, while White defendants accounted
for just 19.8 percent. 28 Normalized for demographics, people of color in the
Twin Cities are statistically twelve times more likely to be convicted of
second-degree felony-murder. 29
More troubling than the racial distribution of second-degree felonymurder convictions is the disparity in what the convictions reflect in the

(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). The defendant was alleged to have “rough housed” a child;
semen was found on the child. Id.
22. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011).
23. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011).
24. Complaint at 2, State v. Casey, No. 27-CR-13-22282 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2013);
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra note 6.
25. Quick Facts Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/MN [perma.cc/9FXV-D3H2].
26. MINNESOTA STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,
AGE,
RACE,
&
ETHNICITY
(2018),
https://mn.gov/admin/
demography/data-by-topic/age-race-ethnicity/ [perma.cc/6H2L-GUYN].
27. Race and Ethnicity in the Minneapolis Area (Metro Area), CEDAR LAKE VENTURES,
INC.
(Sept.
14,
2018)
(citing
U.S.
Census
data),
https://statistical
atlas.com/metro-area/Minnesota/Minneapolis/Race-and-Ethnicity [perma.cc/7Z53-9F8N].
28. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
29. Id.
ND
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shadow of the original charges. The overwhelming majority of convictions
are the result of plea negotiations. 30 Indeed, negotiated plea deals have
become the vehicle by which most criminal cases are resolved around the
country. 31 66.7 percent of the White defendants convicted of second-degree
felony-murder in Minnesota were initially charged or indicted with more
serious levels of homicide. 32 For White defendants, a guilty plea to seconddegree felony-murder most often represents generous resolution relative to
the exposure under the original complaint or indictment. White defendants
in the Twin Cities routinely benefit by pleading down to second-degree
felony-murder.
Conviction statistics under the second-degree felony-murder doctrine
present the opposite trend for defendants of color. Defendants of color
sentenced to second-degree felony-murder had their charges reduced in
only 38.5 percent of cases. 33 For the rest of the defendants of color, their
second-degree felony-murder conviction represented the most serious
count. 34 The plea bargaining statistics reveal a striking racial disparity: White
defendants plead to reduced felony-murder charges at nearly double the
rate of defendants of color.
Inequities run deeper than statistically tilted plea negotiations. The
facts of individual cases, as alleged in the criminal complaints, best illustrate
two parallel yet unenviable trends. White defendants are frequently
punished leniently, while defendants of color receive harsher treatment
even when the facts support opposite outcomes.
A robbery involving six codefendants that left a young man dead
illustrates this disturbing trend. Two of the codefendants were Black, and
four were White. 35 While all six were initially indicted for first-degree
murder, 36 the four White codefendants were permitted to plead guilty to a
30. See id.
31. INNOCENCE PROJECT, REPORT: GUILTY PLEAS ON THE RISE, CRIMINAL TRIALS ON
THE DECLINE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminaltrials-on-the-decline/ [perma.cc/9TSN-B7QH]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, THE
TRIAL
PENALTY
REPORT
14
(2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/
getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixthamendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf [perma.cc/7P42YC7F].
32. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Brandon Stahl, Suburban Women Plead Guilty to Murder for Their Role in Drug
Robbery-Turned Slaying, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.star
ND
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reduced charge under the inherently pliable second-degree felony-murder
rule. 37 The Black defendant who fired the gun pled to second-degree
intentional murder. 38 While the Black codefendant who did not fire the gun
pled guilty to second-degree felony-murder, he received a harsher-thanguideline sentence. 39 The White codefendants all received sentences within
guideline sentence range for second-degree felony-murder. 40 None of the
four White codefendants received consecutive sentences; both of the Black
codefendants did. 41
According to the complaint and newspaper coverage of the incident,
five of the codefendants hatched a detailed plan to break into their drug
dealer’s apartment to steal drugs and take back a gaming system. 42
Newspaper coverage reported that at least part of the group was intent on
“beating the [expletive] out of [the drug dealer] then taking everything.” 43
The same source recounted an agreement to split what they burglarized,
“since it’s a group deal.” 44 The sixth codefendant was reportedly recruited
to bring a gun; he “made sure it was loaded.” 45 As a car waited outside, four
of the codefendants burst into the apartment, according to the criminal
complaint. 46 Some reportedly ransacked it searching for drugs, yelling and
swearing at the victim, while others attacked the decedent and “pistol
whipped” him. 47 The complaint further recounts that they forced the

tribune.com/suburban-women-plead-guilty-to-murder-for-their-role-in-drug-robbery-turnedslaying/470561553/ [perma.cc/3E24-VC8B].
37. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. While he pled down to second-degree unintentional felony-murder like the
White codefendants, his sentence was 24 percent higher than prescribed in the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A
(MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2017).
40. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER,
supra note 6.
41. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
42. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018).
43. Stahl, supra note 36.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018).
46. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018).
47. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018).
ND
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decedent’s girlfriend onto a bed, pointed the gun at her head, and told her
they would kill her if she left the bedroom. 48 She described holding the
decedent as “he took his last breath.” 49 The decedent was shot in the neck;
the bullet grazed his jugular vein, shattered his spine, and fractured his
skull. 50 Prosecutors also noted blunt force trauma to his head and face. 51 The
codefendants reportedly left him there and fled with the drugs. 52
Although it may be argued that lesser charges are warranted because
the White codefendants did not actually pull the trigger, 53 it is a wellestablished tenet of Minnesota criminal law that accomplices are liable for
the conduct of the principal at the same level. 54 Even so, the disparity in
sentencing under the same statutory subsection remains: the Black
codefendant who did not pull the trigger received a significantly harsher
sentence than the four similarly-situated White codefendants. The felonymurder rule should not be contorted to reach inequitable outcomes.

48. Stahl, supra note 36.
49. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018); David Chanen, Mother of Slain Teen Laments A Wasted Life Over Drugs, Mistakes,
STAR TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/mother-of-slain-teen-laments-awasted-life-over-drugs-mistakes/479024163/ [perma.cc/4XD3-6ZTX].
50. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2018).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Admittedly, some legal scholars have taken issue with this tenet, arguing that an
accomplice should not bear full liability for the actions of the principal actor. See Michael
Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129 (2013); Sherif Girgis, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability:
Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013); Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the
Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985).
54. State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020) (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.05(1)
(2018)); State v. Whitman, 114 N.W. 363, 364 (Minn. 1908). It is notable that in at least one
U.S. jurisdiction, “[f]or all intents and purposes the ‘second-degree felony-murder’ rule for
accomplices has been abolished.” CAL. STATE SENATE, FACT SHEET FOR SENATE BILL 1437
(2018); see also People v. Cruz, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (citing CAL.
STAT. ch. 1015, § 1 (2018) (explaining that “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life”). If
Minnesota had a similar limitation, the five codefendants who did not fire the fatal shot may
not have been convicted of second-degree felony-murder. Other states align with Minnesota
in holding accomplices fully liable under the felony-murder doctrine. See, e.g., State v.
Chambers, 515 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Blair, 228 P.3d 564, 568
(Ore. 2010); State v. Rios, 172 P.3d 844, 846 (Ariz. 2007).
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While advocates for the White codefendants may argue that they were
actually treated too harshly, in reality, they reaped the benefit of the seconddegree felony murder rule, considering that the facts could have yielded a
conviction under a far more serious variant of the doctrine. Under
Minnesota law, both the first and second-degree murder statutes have a
provision for felony-murder. 55 Burglary is among the predicate felonies
specifically enumerated in the first-degree felony-murder statute. 56 Ample
facts alleged in the complaints would support this predicate offense. 57 Yet
prosecutors were content with a conviction under the lesser second-degree
felony-murder provision. Their decision transformed potential first-degree
felony-murder life sentences into second-degree felony-murder sentences as
short as twelve and a half years. 58
While the author does not contend that life sentences would be just in
this case, an analytical juxtaposition of the second-degree and first-degree
felony-murder rules illustrates the wide-ranging homicidal liability that exists
on strikingly similar facts. Such discretion perpetuates further inequity in
plea negotiations, trials, and sentencings, leaving a system ripe for abuse and
incapable of delivering racial equity. This example exposes the reasons that
both first-degree and second-degree felony-murder should be excised from
Minnesota’s statutory and common law schemes. Doing so will leave a set
of thoughtfully-tiered laws, accounting for all levels of homicidal and lessthan-homicidal liability, 59 and it will create a construct under which these six
codefendants, Black and White, could have been equitably charged or
indicted, negotiated with, tried, and sentenced.
While it is easy to criticize prosecutors who apply the felony-murder
doctrine in racially inequitable ways, one should not overlook that it is the
theoretical underpinnings of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrines that
enable them to do so. Minnesota’s statutory schemes provide the

55. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2)(1) (2016).
56. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016). The Supreme Court of Minnesota
recognizes first-degree felony-murder prosecutions predicated on burglary. See, e.g., State v.
Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Minn. 2014).
57. See Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist.
Ct. 2018) (alleging on its face burglary while possessing a firearm as the predicate felony).
58. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2016); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra note 6.
59. Absent the felony-murder doctrine, the Minnesota Legislature has erected a
thoughtful, effective, and wide-ranging statutory scheme that aptly addresses all unjustified
killings, ranging from second-degree manslaughter, MINN. STAT. § 609.205(1) (2020) to third
degree murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.195(a) (2020), to second-degree intentional murder,
MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2020), to first-degree murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1)
(2020).
ND
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architecture for convictions under statutory provisions with guideline
sentences ranging from just over ten years to life in prison for essentially the
same conduct. Both the theory and application of Minnesota’s felonymurder doctrines must be repaired or repealed if the disparities cannot be
reconciled. As the law stands now, felony-murder makes for faux plea
negotiations, and as exemplified below, unjust charging. These are the
byproducts of the unconscionably wide prosecutorial discretion inherent in
the doctrine.

C. Charging Discretion Ripe for Abuse
White defendants frequently benefit from the felony-murder doctrine,
while defendants of color have a markedly different experience. Just as this
disparity is painfully apparent in plea negotiations and conviction trends, it
also manifests in charging decisions. Even when prosecutors ultimately
amend their charges, initial charging decisions reveal further racial inequity.
These decisions inarguably impact the course of individual prosecutions,
even when cases gravitate away from the initial charges. It is the stunningly
wide discretion inherent in Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine, in the
abstract, that sustains racially inequitable charging practices.
Defendants of color may face aggressive felony-murder charges for
facts that should not warrant murder prosecutions at all. According to a
criminal complaint and newspaper reports, a Black Minneapolis man had a
dispute with his brother. 60 Isolated in the basement, the victim shot the
defendant. 61 Witnesses say they heard three shots, and the defendant
shouted out, “my brother just shot me.” 62 It was only then that the defendant
returned fire. 63 His defensive gunshots killed his brother only after the
defendant himself received multiple gunshot wounds. 64
In their criminal complaint, prosecutors strained to justify their
second-degree felony-murder charge by noting that the victim’s firearm was
only “a small gun,” 65 as if to imply that the bullets fired from it did not have
lethal potential. It is also noteworthy that prosecutors acknowledged that it
was the victim who pursued the defendant into the basement, where,
cornered, they exchanged gunfire. 66 Self-defense would have negated the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Complaint at 3, State v. Clark, No. 27-CR-18-4772 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2018).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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second-degree assault on which the felony-murder charge was predicated. 67
Legal scholars have advanced compelling arguments as to why most assaults
should not be viable predicate felonies; most states have adapted their laws
accordingly. 68 Charging prosecutors were almost certainly aware of this
fracture in the legal and academic communities. But that did not prevent
them from bringing murder charges against this Black defendant.
The felony-murder charge was not, however, enough for prosecutors:
they went a step further by also bringing the grossly inflated charge of
second-degree intentional murder. 69 The result was a leveraging of plea
negotiations to extract a plea to what appears a lesser count of second-degree
felony-murder. This prosecutorial tool creates an artificial middle count
used to extort guilty pleas from people of color who are actually liable of
lesser crimes, or no crime at all.
Stretching the second-degree felony-murder doctrine to charge and
convict this Black defendant is not an isolated occurrence. Another Black
man left to care for his girlfriend’s infant children was convicted of seconddegree felony-murder, primarily for failing to seek medical care for an
infant’s burned wrist and instead giving him too much over-the-counter
medicine, which doctors opined may have had an unintended sedative
effect. 70 In attending to the child, the defendant had wrapped the child’s
wrist, 71 which likely would have made it difficult to assess the severity of the
burn. This should have been significant to charging attorneys, because the
specific cause of death was a blood infection from the burn. 72
There were injuries consistent with child abuse, which prosecutors
implicitly speculated the defendant had caused. 73 But they also
acknowledged that more than a dozen other people resided in a home

67. MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (2006) (characterizing “justifiable taking of life” as occurring
“when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes
exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death”).
68. Greg Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design: A Call to Adopt a

Tempered Merger Limitation for Predicate Felonies of Assault Under a Minnesota FelonyMurder Doctrine Currently ‘Too Productive of Injustice’, 44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.,
no. 5, 2018, at 98 (advocating adoption of a merger limitation to Minnesota’s felony-murder
doctrine, which would make most assaults inviable as predicate felonies).
69. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
70. Complaint at 2–3, State v. Todd, No. 27-CR-12-17771 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2012).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 3–4.
ND
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containing rotting food, dead animals, and overall filthy conditions. 74 The
complaint further acknowledged a potential accidental fall down the stairs, 75
but prosecutors refused to concede that this could have accounted for some
of the injuries noted in the autopsy. Regardless of the source or
intentionality of the injuries, the cause of death was listed as “complications
from neglect.” 76
In assessing the fairness of attributing fatal neglect to the defendant,
prosecutors should have considered several factors. The defendant, who
was twenty years old, was the only one in the house who took any
responsibility for caring for the children under intensely challenging
circumstances. 77 He described having to feed the children nonperishable
food and being relegated to a small room in the basement. 78 The defendant’s
mother was upset at him for having the children in the house, but that did
not stop her from leaving additional young children in his care when she
too left the home for an unspecified amount of time. 79 The defendant had
made scores of phone calls to the children’s mother; she ignored them all,
so he did not know if or when she would return. 80 Furthermore, when she
finally returned, she was with the children during the hours immediately
before it became known that the infant was dead; the infant did not die while
in the defendant’s care. 81
Rather than focusing on those facts, the charging prosecutor focused
on the allegation that the defendant left the children sleeping in a crib for
an hour before their mother finally returned so he could go to the store—
likely to buy food for the children. 82 Prosecutors make no mention of which,
or how many, adults were in the house for the hour during which he did
not, allegedly, “arrange for supervision.” 83 A second-degree felony-murder
conviction for this young Black defendant represents a miscarriage of
justice, and it stands in stark contrast to the manner in which the doctrine is
generally employed in cases charged against White defendants.
Even when later amended, initial charging decisions often reflect
deference to White defendants ultimately convicted of second-degree
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 1–4.
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felony-murder. Two men were shot to death at a St. Paul motel because one
of them allegedly owed a codefendant $1,000. 84 The White defendant drove
the killer to the hotel, knocked on the door, then helped force entry. 85 He
watched as several shots were fired, then the victims bled to death in the
parking lot and on a nearby roadway. 86 After the defendant fled in his car,
he later picked up the shooter and other codefendant and drove them
further away from the scene while they plotted their stories to avoid
incriminating one another. 87 Police found the two lifeless bodies and quickly
apprehended the defendant. 88 Yet prosecutors effectively ignored both
deaths when making their initial charging decision: they charged the White
defendant only with aiding and abetting attempted first-degree aggravated
robbery and aiding and abetting attempted simple robbery. 89 These offenses
carry statutory maximum sentences of just ten and five years, respectively. 90
Prosecutors failed to charge second-degree felony-murder initially. 91
The Black codefendant who was not the gunman in this case was sentenced
to the statutory maximum: forty years in prison. 92 The White codefendant
was sentenced to just over twelve years. 93 The initial decisions impact trial
preparation, investigations, plea negotiations, and sentencings—further
propelling racial inequities.

84. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156 (Ramsey Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2016).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1–2.
90. MINN. STAT. § 609.245(1) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.24 (2014).
91. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156 (Ramsey Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2016).
Defendants of color are routinely charged with felony-murder from the onset of prosecution
for similar or even less serious robberies resulting in unintended deaths. See, e.g., Complaint
at 3, State v. Smith, No. 27-CR-14-1327 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2014); Criminal Felony
Complaint at 2–3, State v. Calloway, No 62- CR-16-6907 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016);
Criminal Felony Complaint at 3, State v. Smith, No. 62-CR-16-6906 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2016); Complaint at 2–3, State v. Foresta, No. 27-CR-13-25524 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2014); Complaint at 3, State v. Turner, No. 27-CR-13-25523 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2013).
92. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1) (2014). Sarah Horner, He Didn’t Pull the Trigger, But He
Gets 40 Years, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.twin
cities.com/2017/02/08/st-paul-man-gets-40-years-for-midway-area-double-murder/
[perma.cc/8UQC-8CF3].
93. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2 DEGREE MURDER, supra
note 6.
ND
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The Twin Cites has an unadmirable history in the disposition of
second-degree felony-murder cases. The record is ripe with disheartening
examples of White defendants benefiting from the felony-murder doctrine,
while defendants of color receive draconian treatment. The racial inequities
manifest in charging, plea negotiations, conviction levels, and sentencings.
Nearly a decade of statistics support these findings. In the abstract, the
felony-murder doctrine is strained, artificial, and unfair. The archaic
doctrine’s application magnifies its flaws. The felony-murder doctrine
exacerbates racial inequities and should be overhauled or altogether
abolished.
III. CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS INTENT: A CASE
STUDY IN THE CHARGING OF A PEACE OFFICER AND AN
INDIGENT MAN OF COLOR
A police shooting and a shooting by an indigent person of color
occurred in recent years in Ramsey County; though similar in factual
consequence, they quickly took on very different legal complexions. In
2016, after months of deliberation, Ramsey County prosecutors made a
charging decision in a high-profile police shooting. 94 The victim was a Black
school cafeteria worker, Philando Castile. 95 The defendant was a veteran of
the St. Anthony Police Department, Jeronimo Yanez. 96 Castile had been
driving with his girlfriend and her young daughter when Yanez pulled the
car over for a broken brake light. 97 Castile “calmly” told the officer that he
had a firearm; he also had a valid permit to carry. 98 Yanez suddenly fired
seven times into the car, killing Castile and nearly striking his girlfriend and
94. See generally John Choi, Ramsey Cnty. Att’y, Remarks Regarding the Hiring of a
Special Prosecutor to Assist in the Philando Castile Matter (July 29, 2016),
https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/County%20Attorney%
20transcribed%20remarks%207%2029%2016.pdf [perma.cc/3H2V-BHSX] (stressing the
importance of being “thoughtful and deliberate” in order to “provide the legitimacy this case
requires and deserves”). The charging decision was announced more than four months after
the incident. See Press Release, Office of the Ramsey County Attorney, Ramsey County
Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against Police Officer in Death of Philando Castile,
RAMSEY
CNTY.
ATT’Y’S
OFF.
(Nov.
16,
2016),
https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/
11.16.16%20County%20Attorney%20Remarks%20as%20Prepared%20for%20Delivery%2
0in%20Yanez%20Case_0.pdf [perma.cc/UQ8S-MDVK]; Felony Criminal Complaint at 7,
State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2017).
95. Mitch Smith, Officer Cleared in 2016 Killing of Black Driver, N.Y. TIMES at A1
(June 16, 2017).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the child. 99 Prosecutors charged Yanez with second-degree manslaughter
and intentional discharge of a firearm that endangers safety. 100
The same office charged a more obscure case nearly a decade earlier
against a nineteen-year-old Mexican immigrant, Alfredo “Freddy”
Gutierrez-Gonzales, who was mishandling a rifle on the front porch of a
house. 101 When Gutierrez-Gonzales heard someone approaching, he put
the rifle down. 102 His friend called out, “Don’t trip, it’s just me.” 103 As
Gutierrez-Gonzales picked the rifle back up, it suddenly went off. 104 The
bullet struck his friend, who was White, in the head; he died at the scene. 105
Prosecutors did not dispute that the rifle going off was anything other than
a tragic accident. 106 Within days, prosecutors charged Gutierrez-Gonzales
with second-degree felony-murder. 107 The peace officer and the young man
of color faced markedly different consequences.
The felony-murder charge in the Gutierrez-Gonzales case rested on a
legally unstable foundation. The criminal complaint clearly enumerated the
predicate felony: reckless discharge of a firearm within a municipality. 108
Unlike most other viable predicate felonies, which require intentional or
knowing levels of mens rea to trigger felony-murder prosecutions, 109 the
predicate felony in the case against Gutierrez-Gonzales required only
99. Id.
100. Felony Criminal Complaint at 7, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2017).
101. Felony Criminal Complaint at 1–3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-0816753 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
102. Id. at 3.
103. State’s Memorandum of Law, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-08-16753
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
104. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-08-16753
(Ramsey County District Court 2008).
105. Id.; Mara Gottfried, Girlfriend of Suspected Shooter: ‘Turn Yourself In . . . ’, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 16, 2008), https://www.twincities.com/2008/11/16/
girlfriend-of-suspected-shooter-turn-yourself-in/ [perma.cc/5SLC-NHDX].
106. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-08-16753
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 1.
109. See, e.g., Butala v. State, 887 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (establishing that arson
is a viable predicate felony); MINN. STAT. § 609.561(1) (2020) (specifying a mens rea
requirement of “intentionally” for the predicate felony of arson); State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d
826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (requiring that the actor knowingly or intentionally commit the
predicate assault to trigger the felony-murder doctrine) (cited in Egan, Collateral and
Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68 (analyzing the general intent crime of firstdegree assault as a Minnesota predicate felony, contrasting it to the elevated mens rea
threshold of specific intent assault required to trigger felony-murder under Ohio law)).

126

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Joint Issue

reckless mens rea. 110 Although under Minnesota common law, offenses with
reckless mens rea—or even strict liability—are technically viable predicate
felonies, 111 this charging vehicle stretches the theoretical framework of the
felony-murder doctrine, which is premised on imputed intent, and has
come under harsh criticism. 112
In State v. Engle, decided just months before Gutierrez-Gonzales was
charged, the Supreme Court of Minnesota assessed the mens rea
requirement for reckless discharge of a firearm within a municipality as a
standalone offense. 113 The Engle Court noted ambiguity in whether the
reckless mens rea required the voluntary act of pulling the trigger, or merely
any voluntary act that “increases the likelihood that the gun will discharge
accidentally.” 114 The Engle Court concluded that any “conscious or
intentional act in connection with the discharge of a firearm” satisfies the
mens rea element. 115
Arguably, the law just months before Gutierrez-Gonzales was charged
required a deliberate, volitional trigger pull. 116 The complaint did not allege
one. 117 Still, prosecutors rushed to charge Gutierrez-Gonzales with felony110. MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a)(3) (2006); see generally State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 595
(Minn. 2008) (developing mens rea required for reckless discharge of a firearm in a
municipality).
111. See State v. Smoot, 737 N.W.2d 849, 853–855 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
felony Driving While Impaired, a strict liability offense, may serve as a viable predicate felony
in felony-murder prosecutions).
112. Interview with Professor George M. Platt, University of Oregon School of Law (Nov.
14, 1969) (cited in State v. Blair, 214 P.3d 47, 57 (Oregon Ct. App. 2009) (stressing “we have
approached the outer limits of the mens rea requirement with respect to murder in the
felony-murder doctrine. In effect what we have is strict liability when one who sets out to
commit a lesser felony with no mens rea—with no mental element of intending to kill
anyone—winds up as a murderer . . . .[T]here will be a door through which the very unusual
defendant will be able to exit from the charge of murder”)).
113. State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2008).
114. Id. at 595–96 (Minn. 2008) (cited in State v. Coleman, 944 N.W.2d 469, 478 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2020) (defining reckless mens rea but applying it to third-degree murder)).
115. State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d at 596. It should not be lost on the reader that the
defendant in Engle, a private security guard, was acting in a quasi-law enforcement capacity.
Id. at 593. While the race of the victim is unclear from the published appellate court opinion,
it is clear that Mr. Engle shooting and paralyzing the victim was not justified. Id.
Notwithstanding the horrific consequences of the shooting, Mr. Engle was not charged with
attempted murder or even assault, and the sentencing judge imposed a mere two years of
probation after which the conviction was to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Id. Rare are the
cases where a lay person of color receives the benefit of such generous charging or
sentencing.
116. See generally id.
117. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-08-16753
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murder. More unnerving, prosecutors made no attempt to satisfy even the
lower post-Engle mens rea threshold. They failed to plead any voluntary
acts by Gutierrez-Gonzales that would have “increase[d] the likelihood that
the gun will discharge accidentally.” 118 The only facts alleged in the complaint
relating to Gutierrez-Gonzales’ handling the rifle are “trying to put a clip in”
and “pick[ing] the gun back up” after “put[ting] the gun down.” 119 This is
routine conduct that peace officers across the nation engage in every day
without criticism; yet it is the sole alleged misconduct on which GutierrezGonzales’ felony-murder charge hinged.
The same office declined to utilize a similar predicate felony against
Yanez. Prosecutors had to have realized that such a charging option was
available; the potential predicate felony was evident as counts two and three
on the very face of the complaint: intentional discharge of a firearm that
endangers safety. 120 The mens rea for the would-be predicate felony was
intentional. 121 If reckless discharge of a firearm could predicate felonymurder charges in the case against Gutierrez-Gonzales, certainly intentional
discharge of a firearm could serve as a predicate felony in the case against
Yanez. Intentional discharge of a firearm is a more legally sound predicate
felony because of its heightened mens rea requirement. Charging seconddegree felony-murder would have recalibrated plea negotiations, trial
strategy, and the way jurors viewed the evidence. It may have even led to a
guilty plea or a different verdict at trial.
The facts only bolster the case for a felony-murder charge against
Yanez. He deliberately aimed his firearm in the direction of Castile and the
other two occupants of the vehicle, and with full volitional control, pulled
the trigger no less than seven times. 122 Obviously, prosecutors thought they
had a strong case for unlawful intentional discharge of a firearm, otherwise
they would not have charged Yanez with those two counts. But they failed
to take the next step and bring the felony-murder charge, even though the
only additional element of proof they would have needed was not in dispute:
Philando Castile’s lifeless body.

(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008) (alleging the “gun suddenly went off . . . the shooting was an
accident”).
118. See Engle, 743 N.W.2d at 596.
119. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Gutierrez-Gonzales, No. 62-CR-08-16753
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2008).
120. Felony Criminal Complaint at 1–2, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey Cnty.
Dist. Ct. 2017).
121. MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a)(2) (2006).
122. Smith, supra note 95.
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The Yanez prosecutors may argue that it was a legitimate exercise of
discretion not to charge felony-murder. That discretion is precisely the
problem: it so rarely gets used to the detriment of peace officers and is so
often weaponized against people of color. 123 Regardless of whether it was
Yanez’s status as a peace officer or the race of the victims that differentiated
the charging in the two cases, this disparity exemplifies unconscionable
systemic bias in the prosecution of police killings and killings by civilian
people of color. If prosecutors cannot harmonize their charging decisions
across these demographics, the felony-murder doctrine should be
abolished.
IV.
GEORGE FLOYD’S LEGACY: LASTING REFORM AND A
SHIFTING SOCIAL PRISM IN ANTICIPATION OF APPELLATE
REVIEW OF MINNESOTA’S FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
The distorted approach to police killings, coupled with larger systemic
racial bias, has plagued the Twin Cities’ handling of felony-murder cases,
other homicides, and crime more generally. In the four years between the
Castile and Floyd killings, Minnesota prosecutors brought charges against
peace officers on just two other occasions. 124 In that time there were fortyseven on-duty police killings in the state. 125 The problem goes back much
further: from 2000–2016, the Office of the Hennepin County Attorney did
not bring charges in a single police shooting. 126 The racial inequity of that
approach and the tacit acceptance of the devastation, dehumanization, and
terror it encompasses have deeply scarred the community. The Chauvin
conviction and appellate posture may cultivate justice in two conflicting
ways: either upholding a measure of accountability against Floyd’s killer in
a way that catalyzes community healing, or, alternatively, prompting a legal
change in a way that would, unfortunately, lessen this killer’s punishment
123. See supra Section II; see also Greg Egan, Opinion, Minnesota Needs to Change Its
‘Felony-Murder’ Doctrine. Racial Inequities Are One Reason, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS at
19A (June 28, 2020).
124. Pat Borzi, Why Are Cops in Minnesota So Rarely Charged in Officer-Involved
Deaths?, MINNPOST (June 1, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/metro/2020/06/why-arecops-in-minnesota-so-rarely-charged-in-officer-involved-deaths/ [perma.cc/2STM-WX7G].
125. Jeff Hargarten, Jennifer Bjorhus, MaryJo Webster, & Kelly Smith, Every PoliceInvolved Death in Minnesota Since 2000, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/fatal-police-encounters-since-2000/502088871/
[perma.cc/C7PV-EPNG].
126. Tom Jackman & Devlin Barrett, Charging Officers with Crimes is Still Difficult for
Prosecutors,
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2020),
https://www.washington
post.com/crime-law/2020/05/29/charging-cops-with-crimes-is-still-difficult-prosecutors/
[perma.cc/WM2V-Z7ZD].
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but facilitate new law benefiting the long-abused community he has so
deeply scarred.
The prosecution of George Floyd’s killer stands apart from even the
other exceedingly rare cases charged against peace officers. It is a sign of
progress, but it also evidences just how far things had deteriorated. The
other recent Minnesota police killings, while driven in part by their unique
factual circumstances, still mirror the racial inequities evident in seconddegree felony-murder prosecutions more generally. They also reflect a basic
deference to peace officers. A Washington County Sheriff’s deputy, Brian
Krook, was recently indicted for second-degree manslaughter for shooting
a young man in the midst of a mental health crisis. 127 The victim was a White,
off-duty Emergency Medical Technician. 128 The victim’s race and
occupation likely motivated prosecutors to seek the indictment. In addition,
there tends to be greater sympathy for victims suffering from a mental health
crisis. 129 Under these circumstances, even though Krook was also White,
prosecutors went to the grand jury. They did not, however, go so far as to
recommend a felony-murder charge. One can speculate as to whether
prosecutors would have pursued felony-murder had the shooting involved
an officer of color. Conversely, had the victim been a person of color, an
indictment may not have been sought at all. What appear to be surface
inroads towards justice in the Krook prosecution are nuanced and may
actually be yet another manifestation of racial inequity. This is an inequity
challenged—but not eviscerated—by the conviction of Floyd’s killer.
The Krook case stands in stark contrast to the most recent prosecuted
police shooting in Minnesota leading up to George Floyd’s killing, but that
does not mean that it harmonizes with the Chauvin case when it comes to
racial justice and policing. Mohamed Noor was a Black, Somali-American
Minneapolis police officer who, in the dark of night, shot and killed a White
woman. 130 While initially Noor was charged with third-degree murder and
second-degree manslaughter, 131 prosecutors later elevated charges, bypassing
127. Summons at 1, State v. Krook, No. 82-CR-19-2887 (Washington Cnty. Dist. Ct.
2019); Matt Sepic, Washington Co. Deputy Says he Felt ‘Horrible’ After Shooting, Killing a
Man Threatening Suicide, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/03/17/washington-co-deputy-says-he-felt-horrible-aftershooting-a-suicidal-man-to-death [perma.cc/3AS4-9RR2].
128. Id.
129. Hargarten et al., supra note 125.
130. Libor Jany, Ex-Minneapolis Police Officer Noor to Plead Not Guilty in Damond
Shooting Death, STAR TRIB. (April 26, 2008), https://www.startribune.com/
minneapolis-police-officer-mohamed-noor-will-plead-not-guilty-in-shooting-death-of-justinedamond/480845391/ [perma.cc/9SZJ-RWGS].
131. Complaint at 1, State v. Noor, No. 27-CR-18-6859 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2018).
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second-degree felony-murder to charge Noor with second-degree
intentional murder. 132 Although bringing criminal charges—perhaps even a
felony-murder charge—was appropriate, intentional murder was a stretch. 133
There was no body camera footage and no incriminating statement by
Noor. 134 His charges far exceeded those that Yanez and Krook faced. Noor’s
was the only one of the three cases where an officer of color killed a White
victim, so the charging and outcome of that case should not be wholeheartedly celebrated.
Just a few miles from the courthouse where Chauvin’s trial was still
drawing to its conclusion, yet another young Black man was gunned down
by a White peace officer, Kimberly Potter. 135 Daunte Wright had been
pulled over for expired license plate tabs, allegedly tried to flee, and was
shot because Potter somehow thought she was handling a taser instead of a
firearm. 136 A County Attorney promptly charged the officer with SecondDegree Manslaughter, and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison
vowed to continue with the prosecution when his office took over. 137 Though
it appears more a case of ineptitude than savagery, this case has many of the
same racial, policing, and power elements of Chauvin’s. And the likely result
is another conviction. That would be the right outcome; it would reinforce
the sea change finally evident in Chauvin’s case. The hope is that these tragic
cases will decrease in frequency, but when they do happen, the trend for
greater accountability will continue.
132. Second-Degree Murder Charge Officially Added to Noor Complaint, 5
EYEWITNESS NEWS KSTP (Mar. 26, 2019), [web.archive.org/web/20200614165049/
https://kstp.com/news/second-degree-murder-charge-officially-added-mohamed-noorcomplaint/5175413/].
133. In its statutory amendments in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the Minnesota
Legislature recognized a more nuanced mental state required for prosecution of an officer
in Noor’s position, which in some ways validated his defense. Compare MINN. STAT. §
609.066(1)(1) (2016) (classifying a killing as “justified” only when actually “necessary to
protect the peace officer or another from apparent death or great bodily harm”), with MINN.
STAT. § 609.066(1)(1) (2020) (inserting “if an objectively reasonable officer would believe,
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the
benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary”).
134. Jany, supra note 130.
135. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Azi Paybarah, Protesters Clash with Police After
Minnesota Officer Shoots Black Man, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/us/brooklyn-center-minnesota-police-shooting.html
[perma.cc/8PPJ-SNRQ].
136, Id.
137. Amy Forliti, Minnesota AG’s Office to Prosecute Case Involving Wright’s Death,
STAR TRIB. (May 21, 2021), https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-ags-office-to-prosecutecase-in-wrights-death/600059862/?utm_source=newsletter&
utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=talkers [perma.cc/TV9B-93ML].
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Against this backdrop it appears we are at a fulcrum in our long history
of racial inequity in the prosecution and sentencing of police killings, and in
the use of the felony-murder doctrine more generally. Up until now, most
frequently, officers who killed were never even charged. 138 On the rare
occasions—two others in recent memory in Minnesota—that a White officer
was charged or indicted, it was only to second-degree culpable
manslaughter, not felony-murder. 139 A person of color is killed by police; the
initial public outcry dissipates; only in rare cases are charges brought; then
it happens all over again. Community leaders like former Minneapolis
NAACP president Leslie Redmond have expressed their exasperation:
“The 13th [Amendment to the U.S. Constitution] abolished slavery except
if one was duly convicted of a crime. The legacy of slave patrols ha[s]
continued through our current policing system and it is time for a change.
The murder of George Floyd made people realize that silence equal[s]
consent.” 140
Considering that long history of tribulation, the community rightly
celebrated Chauvin’s convictions. But there is a reasonable chance that the
conviction to the top count, second-degree felony-murder, will not stand.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota may answer the call of academics and
practitioners to reevaluate the merger limitation to the felony-murder
doctrine. 141 The high Court may hold that at the very least assaults—and
possibly other felony-level crimes of physical aggression towards a person—
that lead to an unintended death cannot predicate felony-murder. Such a
holding would be grounded in the following reasoning: because the mens
rea, or violent underlying criminal intent was common to the predicate
assaultive crime and murder in the abstract, the two crimes merge. 142
As horrific as his actions were, Chauvin did not intend to kill Floyd.
There was public outrage when he was not charged with intentional
murder, 143 but Ellison and his team were correct to conclude that intentional
murder simply did not fit. Chauvin set out to do something appalling: he
likely wanted make Floyd fear the power imbalance, likely wanted to hurt
138. Jackman & Barrett, supra note 126.
139. Indictment, State v. Krook, No. 82-CR-19-2887 (Washington Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2019);
Criminal Complaint, State v. Potter, No. 27-CR-21-7460 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2021).
140. Interview with Leslie E. Redmond, Esq., Former NAACP President, in St. Paul,
Minnesota (Jan. 3, 2021) (on file with author).
141. Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68.
142. Id. (providing thorough analysis of mechanics of felony-murder doctrine predicated
on assaultive crimes).
143. Harry Litman, Opinion, Does Third-Degree Murder Sound Too Mild for Chauvin?
It’s Exactly Right, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2020), www.latimes.com/opinion/
story/2020-06-02/george-floyd-derek-chauvin-murder-charge [perma.cc/A797-5K3S].
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Floyd; perhaps he even intended to make him beg for his life, or at the very
least recognize that he had the absolute power to take it away. Chauvin likely
further intended to whitewash all of this in a police report he would have
turned over to prosecutors to entice them to charge Floyd, had he survived.
He likely intended to make Floyd out as the bad actor, maybe even the
aggressor, just as peace officers have done across the Twin Cities and across
the rest of the country with impunity for far too long. Even more appalling,
Chauvin used the power of his badge to try to do all of this. But none of this
could be congruent with an affirmative intent to kill. The Author is among
the harshest critics of what Chauvin did, but to assert that he intended to
slowly kill George Floyd in broad daylight amidst a sea of onlookers is
misguided.
As unsettling as this prospect is, and as much as Derek Chauvin
deserves a harsh penalty for the heinous murder he without question
committed, the progressive elements of the legal community have to
recognize that in many ways, Chauvin’s case provides a sound factual
scenario to finally rewrite Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine by adopting
a merger limitation. Chauvin was calculated and intentional in perpetrating
an appalling and wholly unjustified assault, but he did not intend to kill.
Take away the badge, take away the devastation Chauvin’s actions have had
on the community, take away his heartlessness, his violence, his callousness,
and his horrifying belief that he was untouchable, and what is left is a textbook example of the type of prosecution that a merger limitation to the
felony-murder doctrine would preclude. The law must be so clinical, so
objective, and so dispassionate if it is to dispense justice on a broad scale,
even when it seems unpalatable in the short term.
Change in Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine is long overdue. But
from a community, racial equity, and police reform perspective, it would
seem both shameful and tragic if this were to be the case to finally deliver it.
For more than forty years, the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the State
Legislature have turned a deaf ear to calls for reform, 144 silencing those who
have suffered from a racially and socioeconomically biased law weaponized
against the disenfranchised. 145 Shameful, tragic, but not atypical: the world
finally listens when a White person of power speaks.
Chauvin’s legal team will invariably do just that by challenging the
felony-murder conviction with a call for merger. Ironically, the unintended
champion for a long-overdue change in law that would benefit communities
of color may now be this White former officer who has wreaked such
devastation on those very communities. It is not just ironic; it is insulting and
144. Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design, supra note 68.
145. Egan, Minnesota Needs to Change Its ‘Felony-Murder’ Doctrine, supra note 123.

2021]

GEORGE FLOYD’S LEGACY

133

demeaning. However distasteful it may be, Chauvin’s appeal has the
potential to finally cleanse Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine of some of
the gross racial and socioeconomic inequity that has plagued it for
generations.
Peace officers are not the only actors who have perpetuated the
inequities of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine; prosecutors and judges
should not escape blame. 146 As sickening as overturning the most serious
conviction against Chauvin would be, the accompanying evolution in the law
would facilitate justice, even if prosecutors and judges were not ready. The
outcry, tragedy, and reform of the past year should leave their mark on these
ministers of justice, awakening them to the inequities of the felony-murder
doctrine and the way it has long been employed to defile communities of
color. But even if all that has happened in the past year does not have that
effect, a change in the law would drag prosecutors and judges forward,
whether they were ready or not, because it would finally deprive them of a
tool that—unconsciously or intentionally—they have long weaponized against
the disenfranchised. 147
So even if Chauvin’s felony-murder conviction is overturned, George
Floyd will still have had a lasting impact on the law and on the broader
community in which it is immersed. Slow as the waking of conscience may
be, the tide is finally shifting. And that tidal pool is deeper, and hopefully
longer lasting, than just Derek Chauvin’s legal case. Although only one of
the recent Minnesota police killings leading up to Chauvin has resulted in a
conviction, all four cases were brought in the past five years. 148 On an
unprecedented scale in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the streets have
flooded with sustained protest—both in Minnesota and around the world. 149
Their calls are for racial equity and police reform. 150 And it has not been
without effect: the public has successfully demanded laws aimed at fostering
more effective relationships between the police and the community,
preventing police killings, and imposing greater accountability when killings
do occur. 151 Moreover, leaders like Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria
146. See supra Sections II & III.
147. See supra Sections II & III.
148. Jon Collins & Riham Feshir, Two Minnesota Police Shooting Trials, Two Very
Different Verdicts, MPR NEWS (May 1, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/
2019/05/01/two-minnesota-police-shooting-trials-two-very-different-verdicts
[perma.cc/HQ2G-J5HE].
149. Olivia Le Poidevin, George Floyd: Black Lives Matter Protests Go Global, BBC
NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-52967551.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.80 (2020) (calling for the formation of an independent
Use of Force Investigations Unit within the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension to conduct

134

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Joint Issue

Arradondo are now at the helm. He immediately discharged all four officers
involved in Floyd’s death and promised, “The Floyd family will lead me
forward.” 152 Finally, the aggressive charging of Chauvin, 153 like the general
approach of Ellison and his team to this prosecution, are in and of
themselves promising. 154 Things are starting to change.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota may wrestle Chauvin’s murder
convictions away from the communities that rightly celebrated them, but it
cannot take away the reform, the unity, and the dialogue that has grown over
the course of this past year. Moreover, when it comes to the felony-murder
doctrine, the Supreme Court of Minnesota cannot take away that conviction
without also taking away a tool that has been weaponized in the legal system
against communities of color for generations. The ideal outcome is for
Chauvin’s appeal to catalyze a dialogue about a merger limitation to the
felony-murder doctrine, but for the Supreme Court of Minnesota to
recognize that public policy demands that his conviction stand.

officer-involved death investigations); MINN. STAT. § 609.06(3) (2020) (limiting choke holds
and other restraints by peace officers); MINN. STAT. § 609.066(2) (2020) (tightening
restrictions on peace officers’ use of deadly force); MINN. STAT. § 626.5534 (2020) (imposing
a use of force reporting requirement upon chief law enforcement officers); MINN. STAT. §
626.8434(3) (2020) (prohibiting “warrior-style” training); MINN. STAT. § 626.8435 (2020)
(establishing the Ensuring Police Excellence and Improving Community Relations Advisory
Council, which legislators intended to protect civil and human rights, provide for citizen
involvement, and advance reforms that “promote positive interactions between peace officers
and the community”); MINN. STAT. § 626.8469 (2020) (providing for training in crisis
response, conflict management, mental illness crises, and cultural diversity); MINN. STAT. §
626.8475 (2020) (imposing a duty for peace officers to intervene and report “regardless of
tenure or rank”).
152. Sara Sidner, Minneapolis Police Chief Vows to Reform Police Department, CNN
VIDEO
(June
13,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2020/06/13/
minneapolis-police-chief-reform-george-floyd-sidner-pkg-nr-vpx.cnn.
153. Chauvin’s conviction under the second-degree felony-murder doctrine is rare for
peace officers, but squarely akin to what defendants of color have historically and routinely
faced. See supra Section II.
154. Libor Jany, Seeking to Show Pattern of Excessive Force by Chauvin, Prosecutors
Cite Incident with 14-Year-Old Boy Who Couldn’t Breathe, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/chauvin-prosecutors-cite-incident-with-14-year-old-boy-whocouldn-t-breathe/573105501/ [perma.cc/2CWM-X8HP] (detailing prosecution’s intent to
introduce evidence of Chauvin’s prior use of unreasonable force against a fourteen-year-old
boy while “ignoring his pleas that he could not breath”); see also Stephan Montemayor &
Chao Xiong, Four Fired Minneapolis Police Officers Charged, Booked in Killing of George
Floyd, STAR TRIB. (June 4, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/four-fired-minneapolisofficers-booked-charged-in-killing-of-george-floyd/570984872/ [perma.cc/DV8T-GWJK]
(announcing Ellison’s decision to upgrade the charges to include second-degree felonymurder within days of being assigned the case).
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There is momentum behind this outcome. The appellate posture of
the Noor case illustrates Minnesota appellate courts’ prism shift when it
comes to killings by police generally. Although not specifically enumerated
in statute, a time-honored common law requirement for Murder in the
Third-Degree is that the killer’s “general malice” involve “ill will” directed
at someone other than “the person slain.” 155 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals in Noor could not have been any more flagrant in disregarding the
long line of binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 156
instead holding without ambiguity that “[t]he phrase does not preclude the
possibility of a third-degree murder conviction if an unintentional death is
caused by an act directed at a single person.” 157 A bold stance this was for
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, an error-correcting court not authorized
to forge new policy. 158 The Noor appellate court made this ruling knowing
that it would pave the way for reinstating the Murder in the Third-Degree
charge on the eve of the Chauvin trial, which was already pending voir dire. 159
The intermediate appellate court’s legal reasoning was strained at best. In
sum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged in Noor the
overwhelming weight of binding authority, then promptly issued a ruling in

155. State v. Weltz, 193 N.W. 42, 43 (Minn. 1923) (enumerating “intentional driving of
a carriage in among a crowd, or the discharging of a gun among a multitude of people” as
“common illustrations”) (cited in State v. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Minn. 2021)).
Coleman was handed down by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as the Chauvin trial was in
progress. Coleman, 957 N.W.2d at 72.
156. The Noor intermediate appellate court used tortured reasoning to reinterpret timehonored, binding case law and statutory authority. See, e.g., State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d
688, 698 (Minn. 2017) (“Third-degree murder cannot occur when the defendant’s actions
were focused on a specific person.”) (cited in State v. Noor, 955 N.W.2d 644, 654 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2021)); State v. Hanson, 176 N.W.2d 607, 614–15 (Minn. 1970) (holding that
Murder in the Third-Degree “occurs only where the death is caused without intent to effect
the death of any person, a phrase which under our decisions excludes a situation where the
animus of defendant is directed toward one person only”) (cited in Noor, 955 N.W.2d at
654); State v. Lowe, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095 (Minn. 1896) (“It is, however, necessary that the
act was committed without special design upon the particular person or persons with whose
murder the accused is charged.”) (cited in Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 653). See also MINN. STAT.
§ 645.08(2) (2018) (“[T]he singular includes the plural; and the plural, the singular[.]”) (cited
in Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 645) (using a mere general cannon of construction to attempt to
unwrite a well-established tenet of Murder in the Third Degree). The Noor court even quotes
the 1896 murder statute, emphasizing the words “design to effect the death” to argue that
somehow the plain language of the century-old statute invalidates the requirement that the
defendant endanger another person. See 955 N.W.2d at 655.
157. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 656.
158. Jensen v. 1985 Ferrari, 949 N.W.2d 729, 741 n.21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020).
159. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 644.
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direct contradiction to it. This is result-oriented reasoning at its finest, and
it demonstrates just how much the cultural climate has changed.
It is significant that the Minnesota Court of Appeals was receptive to
this change in cultural climate. Noor suggests that appellate courts will no
longer be complacent in police abuse. As a matter of public policy, they will
now instead side with those terrorized by it. On some level, this is a step in
the right direction. However, it is legally nuanced. What is clear is that the
holding in Noor seems to show the courts mirroring the growing public
intolerance of police killings. Not even the Minnesota Court of Appeals is
immune to the evolution George Floyd’s killing has propelled this past year.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota likely will not be immune to this
evolution either. It will uphold both Noor, when it comes to Murder in the
Third-Degree, and Chauvin when it comes to Felony-Murder in the
Second-Degree and Murder in the Third-Degree. It will uphold these
convictions against former peace officers even though it requires making
new law as it pertains to Murder in the Third-Degree, and upholding bad
law, at least temporarily, as it pertains to Second-Degree Felony-Murder.
To the extent that these laws implicate excessive force by police, that is
probably a good thing. But the social dialogue and legal reform should not
stop with the analysis of the five prosecuted Minnesota police killings in
recent memory.
If the high Court does not forge new ground by adopting the merger
limitation in the Chauvin appeal, it should be vigilant not to overlook a more
appropriate case to reform the felony-murder doctrine. Instead of
protecting the White former peace officer who violently betrayed the public
trust, the case that ultimately propels legal reform of the felony-murder
doctrine should look more like most of the convictions that have come
through the system in the last forty years. These cases have borne the mark
of a tragedy, but for opposite reasons: most convictions feature
disenfranchised people of color as defendants. They commit assaults, do
not intend to kill, and cannot hide behind a badge. These actors, though
certainly not blameless, have for years received the draconian treatment that
Chauvin will seek to sidestep on appeal.
The tragedy of George Floyd must not be compounded. Even if his
case exposes some of the faults of the felony-murder doctrine, Chauvin does
not deserve to be the agent of reform—not after what he has done to the
community. The conversation must begin here, but the true reformer has
yet to come forward. The time is ripe. We are reexamining police killings;
now we must reexamine the weaponization of the felony-murder doctrine
against disenfranchised people of color.
Prosecutors have analyzed the Chauvin case through a different lens
than past police killings. Hopefully, appellate court jurists do too. Finally
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deploying a second-degree felony-murder charge against a peace officer with
success demonstrates this shift. It took strong evidence. It also took a jury
that had absorbed the social evolution that has taken place in the year since
George Floyd’s killing.
The convictions will not repair the long-standing racial inequities of the
felony-murder doctrine—or of criminal prosecutions more generally—nor
will they completely halt the onslaught of police killings in the Twin Cities
and in the rest of the nation and world. But they have already had some
effect in making peace officers reevaluate use of force. And regardless of
what happens in the appellate courts, the appeal will force a long-overdue
conversation about substantive felony-murder reform in Minnesota, across
the country, and hopefully in the few nations abroad that still employ the
archaic doctrine. This conversation will embrace evolving norms about
racial justice and policing. The convictions and appeal will make
prosecutors and judges more cognizant of racial disparities that leave gaping
wounds. They will reinforce broader reform, rethinking, and unity. They
will promote, solidify, and stand for justice both in our laws and in our
communities. That will be George Floyd’s legacy.

